INDIA’S aggressive posturing in the aftermath of the April 22 Pahalgam incident faced a significant diplomatic setback, as key global players exhibited strategic hesitancy and withheld the unqualified support New Delhi had anticipated.

Its decision to adopt a confrontational stance toward Pakistan—attributing the attack to alleged “cross-border terrorism” — was not merely reactionary, but part of a broader strategic shift that has been unfolding over the past decade.

The Modi-led BJP government, while is often viewed through the lens of Hindu nationalist ideology, operates with a deeper strategic calculus: to redefine India’s role in South Asia and assert itself as the region’s uncontested power.

The Pahalgam incident was likely seen in New Delhi as an opportunity to reinforce this posture.

This approach was underpinned by a perception of a favourable international climate. India’s growing ties with the United States, its central role in the Quad alliance, and its positioning as a bulwark against China led policymakers in New Delhi to believe that strategic partners would offer unequivocal support.

Meanwhile, Pakistan was seen as weakened — grappling with economic turmoil, diplomatic isolation from the West, a heavy reliance on China, and internal political fragmentation.

Thus, the escalation following the Pahalgam incident was a calculated move to leverage India’s growing capabilities and redefine its relationship with Pakistan.

However, New Delhi was surprised to find that it could not muster the international backing necessary to legitimise a more aggressive response. The United States prioritised strategic stability and long-term partnerships over taking sides; China maintained its alliance with Pakistan while outwardly appearing neutral; while the Gulf states, too, opted for caution.

Washington not receptive

Initial optimism buoyed by US Vice President JD Vance’s visit around the time of the attack fuelled the belief that Washington would support India unequivocally.

But these expectations were quickly deflated when President Trump downplayed its urgency, his remarks, devoid of the “nuclear flashpoint” framing used by previous US administrations, conveyed a notable indifference.

Senator Mushahid Hussain, a former head of Senate committees on Foreign Affairs and Defence, remarked that President Trump, who does not represent the traditional pro-India American security establishment, is fundamentally against war and does not want to play into the hands of what he termed “Indian warmongers”.

Adding to this recalibration was the cautious language adopted by senior US officials. Under Secretary of Defence Elbridge Colby, in a statement after meeting with Indian envoy Vinay Mohan Kwatra, avoided mentioning Pakistan, terrorism, or even the Pahalgam attack itself.

Instead, he reiterated general commitments to defence cooperation — messaging that aligned with Washington’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy, where India’s value lies primarily in its role as a counterweight to China.

Nevertheless, the US actively sought to de-escalate tensions. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s phone calls to PM Shehbaz Sharif and Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar focused on condemning terrorism, urging restraint, and promoting bilateral cooperation to preserve peace in South Asia.

In an illustrative moment, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh called his American counterpart Pete Hegseth on Thursday, reiterating familiar accusations that Pakistan was destabilising the region and supporting terrorism. The Indian side subsequently claimed Hegseth endorsed India’s right to self-defence.

However, the official readout from the US Department of Defence made no mention of Pahalgam, the regional tensions, or even Pakistan.

In an X post, Hegseth later offered a generic expression of support for India, saying, “I offered my strong support. We stand with India and its great people.”

Commenting on the situation, American scholar Daniel Markey observed: “Washington believes that there is not a straightforward military solution to India’s security problem.”

He further noted, “Given these uncertainties, Washington is not inclined to give a public green light to Indian military operations even though it is sympathetic to India’s plight.”

At the same time, Pakistan should not misinterpret the absence of full-throated US support for India as an endorsement of its own position.

American officials, from State, Pentagon and Langley, have all applied subtle pressure on Pakistan as well — encouraging cooperation with India on the investigation, a stance at odds with Islamabad’s demand for an independent probe.

The US has also nudged Pakistan to issue a stronger condemnation of the attack, something the Pakistani government has increasingly done following the initial Foreign Office statement after the attack.

This lack of specific international endorsement — especially from Washington — fueled perceptions of American reluctance to take sides in the absence of water-tight evidence. As international media began scrutinising India’s failure to publicly substantiate its allegations against Pakistan, skepticism grew, weakening India’s ability to rally global support, unlike in the aftermath of the 2019 Pulwama attack.

Adding to India’s diplomatic headwinds is lingering Western frustration over its neutral stance on the Ukraine war, continued energy ties with Russia, and reluctance to align with broader Western geopolitical goals.

Former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, Masood Khan, noted: “There is a rethink going on in Washington. India has been riding on the back of the US without any reciprocity.”

“In fact, it has gotten away with a lot of defiance and hubris. Americans know how to watch their interests. By now they know India is playing them and would not do their bidding in the region,” he added.

Friends in the East

Meanwhile, China adopted a more calculated and nuanced approach. Officially, Beijing referred to the Pahalgam attack as a “terrorist incident” and urged both India and Pakistan to exercise restraint—language that projected neutrality. This seemingly balanced tone also reflected China’s recent efforts to stabilize relations with India following tensions along the Line of Actual Control.

However, behind the scenes, China has quietly supported Pakistan’s call for an independent investigation and maintained robust military cooperation with Islamabad. This dual-track messaging allowed China to present itself publicly as a responsible regional power while continuing to reinforce its “ironclad” partnership with Pakistan.

The Gulf states — traditionally viewed as friendly toward India due to strong economic ties and the presence of a large Indian diaspora — also chose a measured, noncommittal approach. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar all issued statements emphasising de-escalation and peaceful resolution.

These responses were less about backing India’s position and more about protecting their own strategic interests. Saudi Arabia, invested in regional stability, was keen to avoid alienating either India or Pakistan.

The UAE, while a close Indian economic partner, also hosts a large Pakistani workforce and values diplomatic equilibrium. Qatar, known for its mediatory diplomacy, maintained a neutral stance consistent with its broader foreign policy posture.

Published in Dawn, May 2nd, 2025